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Abstract
The purpose of this study is to look at the influence of honor upon the motivation 
of the Confederate soldiers of Archer’s Tennessee Brigade. This brigade, which was 
recruited in the central Tennessee slave belt, originally consisted of the 1st Tennessee 
Infantry (Maney’s), the 7th Tennessee Infantry and the 14th Tennessee Infantry 
Regiments. It was organized on August 5, 1861 and surrendered with Lee at 
Appommattox on April 9, 1865. This brigade was part of General A.P. Hill’s “Light 
Division” and fought in all of the major battles of the Army of Northern Virginia.
This brigade, that held the center and crossed into the angle at Pickett’s charge, 
was a product of the antebellum society from which it was recruited. This antebellum 
Southern society was heavily influenced by the ethical code of honor as discussed by 
Bertram Wyatt Brown in Southern Honor. It is this now dead code of honor that dictated 
the ethics and behavior of the men of Archer’s Tennessee Brigade and that kept the 
soldiers in the ranks even when it was clear that the Southern nation was doomed and 
death inevitable.
The same code of honor also was to have a homogenizing and democratizing 
influence upon the soldiers of the aristocratic antebellum society. In the slave and land 
society of the antebellum south, economic opportunity was virtually non-existent. This 
resulted in a rigid aristocratic social hierarchy that became closed with little social 
mobility. The war changed this by making social mobility once again possible by 
removing the barriers of wealth. This tended to homogenize the society leading to the 
myth of white equality that was the accepted vision of the antebellum south until recently.
vi J
1. Honor and Southern Equality
It was the afternoon of July 3, 1863 at Gettysburg.
The cannonade had finally halted and the smoke enveloping 
Cemetery Ridge cleared enough for June Kimble, an orderly 
sergeant of the 14th Tennessee, Archer's Tennessee Brigade, 
to get an unobstructed look at that part of the Federal line 
against which his unit would soon advance.1 As an 
experienced combat veteran of two years service, Sergeant 
Kimble recognized the extreme danger that the situation 
presented. In a few minutes, the brigade, now numbering 
about 900 following losses on the first day of the battle, 
and eight other brigades, consisting of 10,500 men in total,
1 Archer's Tennessee Brigade consisted of the 1st, 7th 
and 14th Tennessee infantry regiments in addition to the 13th 
Alabama regiment and the 5th Alabama Battalion. The 7th and 
14th Tennessee were the core of the Brigade and had been 
recruited from the middle, slave belt region of Tennessee in 
the spring of 1860. The 1st Tennessee Volunteer regiment had 
also been part of the brigade until spring of 1862 when it 
was replaced by the 1st Tennessee Confederate. In the summer 
of 1862 the 19th Georgia was attached but was later replaced 
by the 13th Alabama and 5th Alabama Battalion in the winter 
of 1862. In addition, during the first year of the war, 
various cavalry troops and artillery batteries were attached 
as well. By the time of Gettysburg in July of 1863 the 
brigade consisted of less than fifteen hundred men but was 
essentially a unit of Tennesseans. After subtracting the 
Alabamians and men lost on the first day of the battle, 
George Stewart in his book Pickett1s Charge. (Dayton: 
Morningside Press, 1980), 175; estimates that there were
about 550 Tennesseans in the assault.
2would advance against the heavily defended Federal 
position.2 They would advance in two lines, stretching 500 
yards from side to side, crossing the mile of open farm 
country that separated them from their enemy on Cemetery 
Ridge. Kimble asked himself aloud, "June Kimble, are you 
going to do your duty today?" He answered his own question 
by saying audibly, "I'll do it, so help me God." Asked by 
the men in his unit what to expect, he replied, "Boys, if we
have to go, it will be hot for us, and we will have to do
our best."3
June Kimble was an original member of the 14th 
Tennessee Volunteer Infantry, now part of Archer's Tennessee 
Brigade of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia. The
assault in which he participated, Pickett's Charge, more
than any other engagement of the Civil War, has become 
synonymous with "the lost cause" of the Southern 
Confederacy. In the Southern literature and history written
2 Ibid., 173.
3 June Kimble, "Tennesseans at Gettysburg- The Retreat" 
Confederate Veteran, cited hereafter as CV, October 1910, 
460. Note: Kimble's first name was Junius but he preferred 
and used the name "June" on his papers and other statements.
7
3after the war, Pickett's Charge has taken on greater meaning 
than it had in the Civil War itself.4 The charge has often 
been characterized as the "high tide of the Confederacy. 1 
It has also come to symbolize the courage and devotion of 
the Confederate fighting man in the discharge of his duty.
As Kimble expressed it that day, "If we have to go ... we
will have to do our best."
What motivated these men to leave their homes and jobs
and take up arms against the United States? Why did they
serve a cause which extracted from them four hard years of 
service accompanied by inadequate rations and supplies, 
rigorous campaigning and constant exposure to death from 
disease and battle? Why did they, as Sergeant Robert 
Mockbee, 7th Tennessee, described it, take part in a "death 
charge?"5
4 Edward J. Pollard, Southern History of the War: The
Second Year of the War (New York: Charles B. Richardson,
1865), 282. The charge is dealt with matter-of-factly in two 
brief paragraphs.
5 Robert T. Mockbee, "Historical Sketch of the 14th 
Tenn. Regt. of Infantry, C.S.A. 1861-1865," (unpublished 
manuscript; Eleanor S. Brockenbrough Library, Museum of the 
Confederacy, 1910), 43.
4The answer to these questions is found in the 
attachment of these men to the concept of Southern honor.
The men of Archer's Brigade were representatives of a 
society in which the concept of honor dictated ethics and 
determined behavior. Under the terms of an unwritten set of 
rules, sometimes referred to as "the Southern Code of 
Honor," all white Southern males were expected to 
demonstrate courage and manliness in defense of their home 
and family, to be willing to quite literally die for their 
country. According to Bertram Wyatt Brown, in his study on 
Southern honor, Southern Honor; Ethics and Behavior in the 
Old South (Oxford University Press: New York, 1982), "honor 
is essentially the cluster of ethical rules, most readily 
found in societies of small communities, by which judgments 
of behavior are ratified." Brown stresses that honor was 
not confined to any rank of society and that Southern yeomen 
and the rich elite alike found meaning in honor's demands. 
This ancient ethic was, says Brown, "the cement that held 
regional culture together."6 An examination of the
6 Bertram Wyatt Brown, Southern Honor: Ethics & Behavior 
in the Old South. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982),
xv.
5motivation of Southern fighting men suggests strongly that 
honor was also the cement which held Confederate military 
forces together until their collapse and surrender in April, 
1865 .
The Southern concept of honor had its origins in the 
celtic and germanic traditions of strong family kinships, 
pride, personal courage and a sense of moral superiority 
transplanted through immigration to the southeast United 
States in the 17th and 18th centuries. This archaic or 
primal honor developed into a unique social system that 
guided the interactions of all classes of Southern society 
with one another. The pervasiveness of this system was the 
means through which upper class elites, the planters, who 
had an economic stake in defending slavery, were able to 
manipulate lower class whites to fight for the Confederacy.7
7 We may speak of the slave system's irrationality only 
in a strictly economic sense and then only to indicate the 
inability of the South to compete with Northern capitalism on 
the latter's grounds. The slaveholders, fighting for
political power in an essentially capitalist Union, had to do 
just that. Eugene Genovese, "The Slave South: An
Interpretation," printed in The Political Economy of Slavery:
Studies in the Economy and Society of the Slave South. (New
York: Random House, 1967), 18.
./
6The concept of honor, as. understood and practiced in the 
South, motivated men to enlist, to serve and to fight.
Honor also gave rise to and made necessary the myths 
associated with the "lost cause" of the Confederacy. In 
Brown's view, honor is the key to understanding why the 
South went to war with the North. "If honor had meant 
nothing to men and women, if they had been able to separate 
it from slavery, there would have been no Civil War."8
The behavior of Southern men was shaped, says Brown, by 
honor "as immortalizing valor," the opinion of others as a 
measure of self worth, characteristics of manliness and 
reliance upon oath-taking."9 Although Brown makes this 
point in the context of a larger discussion of honor in 
Southern society, the applicability of these characteristics 
of honor to an understanding of the motivation of Southern 
fighting men is obvious. Valor, the opinion of others, 
manliness and the consequences of oath-taking are the 
attributes of honor which permit an understanding of what
Brown, xii.
9 Ibid., 34.
7motivated Southern white males to fight for a cause that, at 
best, they understood imperfectly if they cared at all.
June Kimble in his account of Pickett1s Charge refers 
to doing his "duty." Kimble never feels the need to 
explain this word any more than other Confederate veterans 
felt it necessary to explain or define "honor" in the 
context of Southern arms. We can assume, however, that 
Confederate fighting men understood instinctively what was 
meant by "duty" and "honor" and would recognize the 
presence, or absence, of both in the society in which they 
lived.
For Confederate soldiers doing their "duty" meant the 
willingness to fight to defend home and family which were 
the repositories of honor. "Honor" in this context was 
understood to mean the performance of duty by an individual 
in such a way as to not discredit himself, his family, 
friends and neighbors. The Confederate South was therefore 
a society in which "duty" and "honor" were inextricably 
bound and these concepts determined the behavior of its 
white male members when that society was threatened.
8Confederate soldiers, regardless of rank or social 
background, took a solemn and binding oath, most often 
before the other members of their unit and in the presence 
of family and friends, to perform honorable duty on behalf 
of their state. They were aware that once they sealed their 
oath that their options were limited. In the Southern way 
of thinking a man's word was his bond. From the moment he 
swore his oath, the only honorable means by which a 
Confederate soldier could quit his unit were through the 
consequences of severe wounds, capture or death.
Confederate fighting men were acutely aware that they 
were representing their communities and their families.
They were conscious of the need to honor their vow and do 
their "duty" for they realized that anything less meant 
dishonor and failure as a man in a society in which "honor," 
and the "manliness" characteristic of it, defined individual 
males. By that same token, dishonorable behavior, the 
failure to do one's duty, e.g. cowardice before the enemy, 
shirking or desertion, was the loss of community approbation 
and eternal shame for the individual, his family and 
friends. The average Southern white male depended for his
9self worth on the opinion of others. He did not need to be 
told that his behavior as a soldier would be a major factor 
in shaping that opinion. June Kimble, for example, one of 
the few Confederate survivors of Pickett's Charge, describes 
how he walked backwards toward Confederate lines following 
the collapse of the attack lest he be shot in the back.10
The importance of understanding honor as the cement 
which held the Confederate military together is necessary in 
order to refute a fairly common myth on the existence of 
"white equality" in the antebellum and Confederate South.
The reason for the myth was the need for Southern apologists 
and romanticists to assign a higher purpose to the defense 
of the Southern cause than is actually the case. According 
to the myth, the reason Southern white males answered the 
call to arms in 1861 was to defend "states' rights" and only 
incidentally the cause of slavery. Little effort is made to 
differentiate the motives to go to war of the different 
classes of Southern society. Whatever disparities may have 
existed based on wealth are more than compensated, in the
10 Kimble, Ibid.
10
view of the myth, by white male equality. The myth would 
have you accept that in the antebellum South all of the 
white male members of society, by virtue of being white, 
were "equals." Acceptance of the myth meant that there was 
general agreement among Southern whites on the necessity to 
preserve the peculiar institution of slavery that, in this 
interpretation, was relatively benign and separated Southern 
society into two classes of whites and non-white slaves.11 
In this myth, all Southern whites were equal and slavery was 
a system operated by whites for the benefit of both races. 
This mythology emerged after the war and helps to explain 
why some essential truths about antebellum class differences 
have been all but ignored. The postwar mythology of a 
collective Southern "gentility" fighting hordes of northern 
"barbarians" elevated the Southern cause, created heroes of 
appropriately mythological proportions in Robert E. Lee and 
Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson, (there are no Northern 
counterparts), and created the comforting legend, (for 
unreconstructed Southerners), of the "Lost Cause." This
11 George Fitzhugh, in Cannibals All, is probably the 
best known of these proponents of slavery.
./
11
myth of white equality in the antebellum South is false, 
however, and has obscured the role of honor as the force 
that made men fight for a cause that in many cases was 
against their own social and economic self interests.
The basic hollowness of the myth of white equality can 
be determined in part from census data collected in 
Antebellum Tennessee. Tennessee in 1860 was a structured 
agrarian society dominated by a small elite, the planters, 
who represented less than one percent of the white 
population but who controlled the majority of wealth as 
represented by slaves and land. The majority of white 
society was composed mainly of the families of poor and 
middle class farmers and laborers. Many of these families 
lived at a subsistence level and, in some cases, were little 
better off economically than the slaves who worked the 
fields.12
Joseph C.G. Kennedy, Superintendent, Population of 
the United States in I860: compiled from the original returns 
of the Eighth Census, under the direction of the Secretary of 
Interior (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1864), 456- 
471; and Eugene Genovese, 20.
An analysis of information supplied by Confederate 
veterans to the Tennessee Civil War Questionnaires provides 
the best direct evidence to refute the concept of "white 
equality" in the antebellum South.13 The questionnaires, 
compiled between 1915 and 1922, requested from each veteran 
basic information on his military service and a discussion 
of his antebellum life style including family background, 
education, occupation, slave ownership, and attitudes 
concerning social equality and social mobility.
Utilizing the Tennessee Questionnaire data, the 
composite picture of an enlisted soldier that emerges is of 
an individual who enlisted in 1861 at the age of 19, came 
from a farming background in which he or his family owned a 
slave, had a median wealth of approximately $2,000 and one 
year of schooling.14 The composite data for Tennessee 
officers from the same source indicates that officers were,
13 Gustavus Dyer and John Moore, eds. The Tennessee 
Civil War Veterans Questionnaires (Easley: Southern 
Historical Press, Inc., 1985), hereafter cited as TQ.
14 Fred Bailey, Class and Tennessee's Confederate 
Generation (Chapel Hill and London: University of North
Carolina Press, 1987), 147-148, 153. These surveys have a
disproportionate number of the ante-bellum elite responding.
13
at time of beginning military service, older, wealthier, 
better educated and came from slave owning backgrounds in 
which the number of slaves owned was between 2 0 and 50.15
Of the 1,650 respondents to the Questionnaire, 54 can 
be identified as members of the Tennessee regiments which 
were part of Archer's Tennessee Brigade.16 Disregarding the 
military rank of these respondents, 33 respondents (61 
percent) either owned slaves themselves or came from 
families which did. The remaining 21 respondents (3 9 
percent) came from non-slave owning backgrounds including an 
anomalous "Yankee" from New York who, after less than one 
year's stay in the South as a shoe maker and livestock 
broker, enlisted in the 7th Tennessee. The high proportion 
of respondents from a slave owning background is not 
surprising given the large slave populations of the
15 Ibid.
16 There were actually 60 respondents who indicated that 
they were members of the regiments making up the Archer 
Brigade. Four respondents gave confusing answers on battles 
and dates which suggested that they might have served in 
cavalry units with the same regimental number. Two other 
respondents did not fill out the questionnaire but submitted 
other documents on their service which did not contain 
sufficient information for statistical analysis.
14
Tennessee counties from which these regiments were formed.
It is an analysis of their responses which strips away the 
mythology of white equality. Correlating the responses of 
the veterans of Archer's Brigade to questions concerning 
white equality uncovers a major difference between the 
Brigade's slave owning and non-slave owning respondents.
The responses of the two groups, slave owning and non-slave 
owning, diverge sharply on the questions of equality, 
opportunity and social integration available to white 
southern males in antebellum Tennessee. According to the 
myth, slavery made possible the sense that all white men 
were equal. The truth is that slavery did not eradicate the 
line of demarcation between southern white "haves" and "have 
nots," but instead emphasized the gap which existed between 
the classes.
Four questions in particular, as answered by Archer's 
Brigade respondents, refute the myth of white equality in 
the antebellum South. The questionnaires, completed when 
much of the homogenizing influence of the war had worn off, 
reveal a surprising view of antebellum white society in 
which class distinctions, on the basis of slave ownership,
15
were keenly felt by poor and non slave owning whites. The 
questionnaires provide, along with the works of Bertram 
Brown and Eugene Genovese, a differentiated view of class 
relations in antebellum Tennessee at odds with the general 
picture of white social unity and harmony on the basis of 
being white in a slave-owning culture.
Question 1
"Did the men who owned slaves mingle freely with those 
who did not own slaves, or did slaveholders in any way 
show by their actions that they felt themselves better 
than respectable, honorable men who did not won 
slaves?"
(Answered "mingled freely")
Category Number Yes (percent) No (percent)
(no response)
Slave owners 33 30 (90) 3 (10)
0 (00)
Non slave owners 21 10 (48) 9 (43)
2 (09)
The members of the slave owning class, the antebellum 
elite, tended to see only cordial relations between the two 
classes of white society. Their answers, however, uncover a 
patronizing attitude toward the non-slave owning whites.
For example, slave owner Benjamin Blanks Batey of the 1st
16
Tennessee answered that there was no inequality "in the
community where I (was) brought up. Any one male or female
that conducted themselves properly were treated in a nice
social manner."17 Slave owner R.T. Mockbee commented that
"Intel(1)igent men who owned slaves and other property were
neighborly and considerate in their conduct and tr(e)atment
18of all classes who lived right." Andrew J. McNeill, 14th
Tennessee whose father owned seven slaves, answered,
Those that owned slaves mingled and visited those that 
did not own any and they did not show in any way that 
they thought that they were better than anybody that 
was honest and honorable. They would often send 
(their) Negroes to help others.19
Some of the elites such as George Washington Lewis, 7th
Tennessee, whose wealthy merchant father did not own slaves
but hired free Negroes, was also of the mind of white
equality. He wrote,
It was all one. The slave owners were leaders in 
uplifts. As jolly and hale-fellow well-met, as the 
poorest barefoot. We had a good community. The people
TQ, 291.
Ibid., 1555.
Ibid., 1467.
17
were all on and equally tried to build up the country 
in peace and harmony.20
This view of cordial relations between the classes was part
of the myth of the antebellum South that was propagated by
the elite after the war. It is typical of the ruling elite
to consider themselves as kind and fair people.
A more accurate picture emerges from the less well-to-
do and educated members of the same society. Although the
homogenizing influence of the war gave rise to the myth of
white equality in the antebellum South, the veterans from
poorer backgrounds responding to the questionnaires
remembered a quite different South than that recalled so
fondly by their more wealthy comrades in arms. James 0.
McMeen, 1st Tennessee, whose father worked as an overseer on
a plantation wrote,
(slave owners) did not mingle so freely with the poor 
white people, but held themselves off to some extent.
A poor white man was not look(ed) upon as being very 
far above the negro.21
Ibid, 1356.
21 Ibid., 1464.
18
There are traces of bitterness and resentment in the 
response of non slave owning John Thomas Duke, 7th 
Tennessee, who wrote, "The men who owned slaves did not 
mingle freely with those who did not and they did show by 
their actions that they felt themselves better than them who 
did not own slaves."22 Duke's response was echoed by 
Leander K. Baker, 7th Tennessee, who said, "men who owned 
slaves did not mingle with those who did not own slaves."23
Napoleon Bonaparte Abbot, 1st Tennessee, agreed that, "some 
of the slaveholders seemed to feel themselves better than 
the non slaveholders and hold themselves aloof."24 These 
feelings of class differences still persisted after the war 
for some Confederate veterans as evidenced by W.M. Moss, 1st 
Tennessee, who wrote, "There were social classes then as 
now. Most of the slaveholders thought that they were 
better."25 Surprisingly, Marcus B. Toney, 1st Tennessee,
Ibid., 731.
Ibid., 253.
Ibid. 159.
Ibid. 1605.
19
whose family owned 3 5 slaves, was one of the few respondents 
from the elite background to admit that class distinctions 
existed, if not prevailed, in antebellum Tennessee. "As a 
general proposition," he wrote, "the slave owners were a 
class unto themselves."
Question 2
"Was there a friendly feeling between slaveholders and 
non- slaveholders in your community, or were they
2 Santagonistic to each other?"
(Answered "friendly feelings")
Category Number Yes (percent) No (percent)
(N/A)
Slave owner 33 30(90) 3(10)
0 (00)
Non-slave owner 21 13 (62) 6 (29)
2 (09)
This question, while somewhat similar to Question 1 
above, and, in general, so regarded by the majority of the 
respondents, elicited lower negative responses from non­
slave owners. The distinction may stem from an 
interpretation that while the elite held themselves aloof,
Ibid., actual Question #20 on Form No. 1 and Question 
#23 on Form No. 2 of the Tennessee Questionnaires.
/
20
they were generally not antagonistic toward their non-slave
neighbors. However, those who felt that there was
antagonism, remember and describe it in bitter terms.
Leander K. Baker, 7th Tennessee, who was typical of
this class of respondent noted that slave owners had private
schools for their children and added that while some slave
owners exhibited friendly feeling toward non-slave owners;
the majority did not.27 James O. McMeen, 1st Tennessee,
shared this view and contributed the barbed observation that
the slave owning class looked upon poor whites as being not
much better than the Negroes. "As a rule," said McMeen,
"the slave owner thought of himself a little above the
2 8poorer class of white people."
Marcus B. Toney, 1st Tennessee, replied that although 
relations between the two classes were "not antagonistic,
2 9the slave owners were aloof." An interesting comment was 
provided by Charles Mison, 14th Tennessee, who, after
Ibid., 253.
28 Ibid., 1465.
29 Ibid., 2066.
21
describing a youthful life in which he was indulged and 
family slaves did all the work in the house and fields, said 
relations between the two classes of whites were friendly 
but, "the poorer class of people hated the slaves much more 
than their owners."30
The questionnaire data underscores the considerable gap 
between the slave owning and non slave owning classes.
Owning a slave in antebellum Tennessee was an indicator of 
wealth and status which, in its turn, was an attribute of 
honor and prestige which set those members apart from others 
in society. Those who owned slaves expected deference from 
non-slave owners who, in antebellum Tennessee, were poor 
whites. While many poor whites accepted conditions as they 
were, others were deeply resentful of a social system among 
whites which left them at the bottom with virtually no 
opportunity for social mobility.
Nowhere was this resentment of poor whites more evident 
than in regard to their assessment of economic opportunity 
or its lack thereof in the antebellum South. Economic
30 Ibid., 1548.
22
opportunity and social mobility is a driving force of the 
American dream with the assumption that there are no limits 
for the person willing to work hard enough to achieve a 
dream or goal. This issue of economic opportunity was 
addressed by two similar questions in the Tennessee 
Questionnaires.
Question 3
"Were poor, honest, industrious young men, who were 
ambitious to make something of themselves, encouraged 
or discouraged by slaveholders?"31
(Answered "encouraged")
Category Number Yes No
(N/A)
Slave owners 33 31(94) 2(06)
0 (00)
Non-slave owners 21 11 (52) 8 (39)
2 (09)
This question, and the question that follows, provide 
some idea on how the two classes perceived social mobility, 
i.e. the ability or potential for members of the non-slave 
owning classes to move into the propertied, generally more
Ibid., actual Question #23 in Form No. 1 and actual 
Question #26 in Form No. 2 of the Tennessee Questionnaires.
23
prosperous slave owning class. Since access to the highest 
ranks of Southern honor and manhood are possible only- 
through membership in the appropriate class, that for non­
members can only be gained through marriage or the 
accumulation of wealth, this becomes an important issue.
This connection between manhood and wealth was so obvious 
that G.W. Lamberson, 7th Tennessee, whose mother, "owned a 
Negro boy," responded to this question quite directly that 
"slave holders would encourage poor young men to work and
3 2try to make men of them."
Respondents from the slave owning class, as the 
questionnaire data indicate, generally held a highly 
positive view of themselves as warm, generous, kind and 
helpful in providing advice and encouragement to lower class 
whites in the antebellum period. From the viewpoint of the 
slave owner, there were no economic or social barriers to 
advancement. A typical response was provided by Deering J. 
Roberts, 1st Tennessee, who began the war as a private and 
ended it as a regimental surgeon and whose father was a part
Ibid., 1319.
24
owner of the Nashville Banner. According to Roberts, poor 
whites, he emphasized, were "not only encouraged but 
assisted both financially and otherwise."33 John M. Powell, 
7th Tennessee, agreed that "worthy boys and girls were 
encouraged and assisted financially. 1,34 J.B. Tate, 7th 
Tennessee, commented on this question that "No Southern man 
of those days would have stooped to keep any young man of 
character down. An industrious person was given every 
inducement to press on in any chosen field."35
However, much like the responses regarding the 
existence of friction between the classes, the poor non­
slave owning respondents saw considerable barriers to their 
advancement. John Thomas Duke, 7th Tennessee, responded 
that poor whites "were discouraged by most slaveholders."36
Leander K. Baker, 7th Tennessee, and Napoleon Bonaparte 
Abbott, 1st Tennessee, both agreed that poor whites were
Ibid., 1855.
34 Ibid., 1761.
35 Ibid., 2028.
36 Ibid., 731.
25
"discouraged, 1 by slave owners.37 But the real question of 
social mobility is not whether poor whites were encouraged 
but whether opportunity for advancement existed?
Question 4
"Were the opportunities good in your community for a 
poor young man - honest and industrious - to save up 
enough to buy a small farm or go in business for 
himself? 1,38
(Answered "opportunities were good")
Category Number Yes No
(N/A)
Slave owning 33 31 (94) 2 (06)
0 (00)
Non-slave owning 21 10(48) 10(48)
1 (04)
Not unexpectedly, in line with their previous answers, 
respondents from the slave owning group were convinced that 
"good opportunities" for economic advancement existed for 
poor whites. Nearly half of the non-slave owning group, who 
undoubtedly had first-hand experience of economic 
conditions, had an opposite view. Elijah H. Knight, 7th
37 Ibid., 159 and 252.
38 Ibid. , actual Question #22 in Form No. 1 and actual 
Question #25 in Form No. 2 of the Tennessee Questionnaires.
26
Tennessee, whose family owned 20 slaves, could recall many 
poor white men who, "by industry and economy built up large 
estates."39 C.C. Horn, 14th Tennessee, who "owned one negro 
value five hundred dollars and one horse value four 
hundred," declared that "young men of steady habits could 
succeed as (they) were in demand at good salaries."40 J.B. 
Tate, 7th Tennessee, whose parents owned four Negro women, 
noted that some very successful men had begun their lives in 
poverty and replied that "an industrious person was given 
every inducement to press on in any chosen field."41
Respondents from the non-slave owning group who 
answered this question in the negative recalled, at best, 
only limited opportunities for economic advancement. John 
R. Mullins, 1st Tennessee, whose poverty is attested to by 
his acknowledgement that his family lived in a rented two- 
room cabin and owned no property other than farm tools, 
replied that there was hardly any opportunity for
39 Ibid., 1306.
40 Ibid., 1148.
41 Ibid., 2028.
27
advancement because, "times was hard back then."42 William^ 
Thomas Durrett, 14th Tennessee, also recalled difficult 
economic conditions. Times were very hard, he said, because 
labor "was cheap, prices for products were low and a 
beginner had a hard pull even though the people recognized 
his ability along with his honesty."43 Samuel H. Darnell, 
14th Tennessee, whose only property at the time he enlisted 
consisted of a mare's bridle and saddle and a sixty dollar 
note, could only remember that it was difficult to advance 
economically because low salary levels made it impossible to 
accumulate savings.44 Napoleon Bonaparte Abbott, 1st 
Tennessee, who claimed that he owned no property at the time 
of his enlistment, replied that "very few poor men ever 
became more than laborers."45
Although he came from a slave owning background, Marcus 
B. Toney, 1st Tennessee, was perceptive in recognizing the
Ibid., 1614
43 Ibid., 746.
44 Ibid., 637.
45 Ibid., 159.
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source of this disparity in economic opportunities. He 
acknowledged that poor whites had a chance at economic 
advancement only if they worked in the cities because, "it 
would take a long time on the farm against slave labor."46 
W.M. Moss, 1st Tennessee, noted that "most of the poor 
rented and worked on rich men's farms. Many of them were 
mechanics, blacksmiths, wagon makers, brick and stone 
masons, carpenters and plasterers. Poor men did nearly all 
this kind of work."47 Slavery, that peculiar institution of 
the South, was insidious beyond its corrupting influence on 
elites who drew their wealth and status through the 
ownership and exploitation of other human beings. Slavery 
was also a barrier to the economic and social advancement of 
poor whites.
An examination of the responses to these same questions 
by members of other Tennessee units, particularly those that 
were organized in the middle Tennessee slave belt, appear to 
support the finding that there was a great rift social and
46 Ibid., 2066.
47 Ibid., 1605.
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economically between those who owned and those who did not 
own slaves.48 William C. Dillihay, 1st Tennessee Cavalry, 
was part of Nathan Bedford Forests command and came from the 
same part of Tennessee as the majority of members of 
Archer's Brigade. Dillihay's family owned one slave who
4 8 Census, 456-471. Companies for the regiments came 
from all of the counties of this slave belt region. Their 
populations in 1860 show how large the disparity in wealth 
caused by slavery probably was.
WhiteFree BlackSlave
Davidson 31,056 1,209 14,709
DeKalb 9,533 15 1,025
Franklin 10,249 48 3,551
Grundy 2,813 14 266
Lincoln 15,926 55 6,847
Maury 17,701 143 14,654
Montgomery11,235 106 9,554
Robertson 10,375 29 4,861
Rutherford14,743 190 12,984
Smith 12,015 114 4,228
Stewart 7,404 76 2,415
Sumner 14,227 9 7,700
Williamsonll,415 45 12,367
Wilson 17,787 321 7,964
State Totals 826,722 7,300 275,719
These fourteen counties that contained one fifth of the white 
population, owned forty percent of the slaves. In Williamson 
county, whites were a minority. The large population of 
Davidson county is attributable to the fact that Nashville, 
the state Capitol was there.
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died shortly before the war began. Dillihay recalled the 
economic conditions of the area being shaped by the 
slaveholders who, "before the war seem to be the leading men 
of the country, causing little demand for white labor. The 
Negro emancipation placed white people on a more equal 
footing causing much better opportunities for young men to 
buy homes since the war than before."49
It is possible, through analysis of the Questionnaire 
data, to assign respondents to one of three social classes: 
lower, middle and upper existing in antebellum Tennessee. 
Representatives of the lower classes were those individuals 
who, prior to enlisting in the service, performed manual 
labor, including farming, for other individuals. The 
middle class consisted of independent farmers, tradesmen and 
professionals such as store owners and office clerks.
Lastly, the upper class elites were composed of 
professionals such as doctors, large business proprietors 
and planters. While the mythmakers argue that all white men
49 TQ, 692.
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in the antebellum South were equal, there were significant 
differences based on occupation and personal wealth.50
The greatest indicator of wealth and definer of status 
among the three classes of whites was slave ownership that, 
in effect, divided the three classes of white society into 
two classes, namely slave holder and non slave holder. The 
median wealth of middle class farmers who owned slaves was 
four times that of those who did not own slaves if, for no 
other reason, than slaves were recognized as "property" and 
valued accordingly.51 Virtually all Southern planters and 
most upper class professionals owned slaves. Beyond its 
monetary value the ownership of slaves was important in the 
South as a signifier that the owner had attained the highest 
level of honor. To be an owner of slaves was to have 
achieved a more exalted rank in society befitting the 
representative of a superior race intent on preserving the 
relationship between lord and peasant. Brown relates how
Bailey, 147-148, and 153.
51 Bailey, ibid. The median wealth of non slave owning 
middle class farmers was $1,000 while that of slave owning 
middle class farmers was $4,000.
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the concept of honor was used as a social marker in the
antebellum South to justify slavery and to distinguish among
White social classes.
The South was not founded to create slavery; slavery 
was recruited to perpetuate the South. Honor came 
first. The determination of men to have power, 
prestige, and self- esteem and to immortalize these 
acquisitions through their progeny was the key to the 
South's development. Of course, slavery was wholly 
compatible with honor. In fact, over the course of a 
parallel and mutually sustaining existence, white man's 
honor and black man's slavery became in the public mind
5 2of the South practically indistinguishable.
When the white male members of that antebellum society 
went off to war in 1861 they did so as representatives and 
carriers of certain societal concepts and values which were, 
in the course of that war, to be challenged and forever 
transformed. In ways that no one could have anticipated, 
the war democratized the whole of white male society. Poor 
and lower middle class whites, by virtue of fighting for the 
Confederate cause, entered into a brotherhood of arms. The 
democratization of Southern males through military service 
and the shared ordeal of combat was the great leveller of 
Southern white male society. Nevertheless, the poor whites
Brown, 16.
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who achieved a greater measure of equality because of the 
war and the economic collapse of the South never forgot nor 
forgave the slave owners for perpetuating a system which 
left poor whites on an unequal footing.
Many of the planters and elite of Southern society 
regarded themselves as natural rulers. They believed that 
they were the true heirs to the aristocratic Cavaliers who 
had settled the South. It was commonly believed by this 
elite that the South was founded by royalists and their 
later descendants who departed England in the wake of the 
Royalist defeat by the Roundheads in the English Civil War.
Many of the immigrants that followed were said to be the 
second, and thus dispossessed sons, of the English 
nobility.53 This was tailored to the elite's view that 
honor gave them a natural right to impose their will upon 
their slaves and poor white neighbors. Poor whites, even if 
they were aware that such medieval concepts characterized 
the attitudes of their superiors, had little choice in the
Ibid., 63-70.
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matter except to accept the consequences of "noblesse 
oblige. "54
The elitist mentality of the planters led to the
establishment of a hierarchy in which slave owners expected
and often demanded deference to their views because they
considered themselves to be morally and socially superior to
their fellow white men.
Honor in the Old South applied to all white classes, 
though with manifestations appropriate to each ranking. 
Few could escape it altogether. Gentility, on the 
other hand, was a more specialized, refined form of 
honor, in which moral uprightness was coupled with high 
social position.55
Eugene D. Genovese in his examination of slavery and 
the Southern society, The Political Economy of Slavery: 
Studies in the Economy and Society of the Slave South 
describes this Southern elite as a "master class" and argues 
that it was possessed of an anti-bourgeois spirit derived 
from slavery as the source of the planter's position and 
power. Slavery bound the South economically, says Genovese,
Ibid., 176.
Ibid., 88.
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and granted it the privilege of developing the aristocratic
tradition of a disciplined and cohesive ruling class.
The paternalism of the planters toward their slaves was 
reinforced by the semipaternal relationship between the 
planters and their neighbors. The planters, in truth, 
grew into the closest thing to feudal lords imaginable 
in a nineteenth -century bourgeois republic.56
The influence of wealth, whereby a typical planter would 
be worth forty times the average middle class farmer and 
hundreds of times the poor laborer whom he hired, gave the 
planter not only perceived status but a great deal of real 
power in his neighborhood. This power tended to shape the 
society into a rigid hierarchy with unwritten rules of 
deference and leadership. Since the elite had better access 
to everything, including education and economic opportunity 
and socialized among like-minded individuals of the same 
class, white outsiders, the poor, found themselves in a 
relationship not unlike that of peasant to feudal lord. The 
poor white male was equal before the law and he was 
certainly more equal than any woman or any Black, whether 
slave or freeman. He was acutely aware, however, as the
Genovese, 3 0-31 and 34.
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Questionnaire reveals, that the white family in the
plantation house would never regard him or look upon him as
an equal except in the most extraordinary circumstance.
Deference-and sometimes resentment about having to 
offer it- permeated the exchange of all men of 
differing ranks along the social spectrum. The greater 
the space along the moral and social continuum, the 
more the respect due the higher, the less the regard 
owed the lower. Being affable and condescending was 
required of the man with rank, but clearly the lower 
the subject of such attention was, the less solicitous 
one had to be.57
Slave ownership, particularly among the planter elite,
engendered a patriarchical and elitist mindset coupled with
aggressive behavior which was fostered in at an early age.
No less intense than the influence of slavery was the 
parental insistence upon early signs of aggressiveness, 
demanded by the notions of white masterhood, before the 
child met the outside world at school. The male child 
was under special obligation to prove early virility, 
an obligation in which shame and honor played a 
crucial, if not exclusive role.58
The sons of the planter class were not only allowed but 
often encouraged to misbehave and engage in rowdy behavior.
The authorities who would normally be responsible for
Brown, 63-64.
Ibid., 154.
enforcing breaches of discipline, teachers for example,
declined to do so when the transgressors were the sons of
the elite. These authorities were aware that they were
generally powerless to enforce discipline in cases where
parents would reject any measure aimed at curbing the
natural spirits of the male child.
Mothers had to cheer their sons' little victories of 
pride or stand apart in mortification and silence.
They too admired the male honor that deprived them of 
all but vicarious pleasure in the achievements of their
59men.
This did not prevent, however, the disciplining of boys 
from less privileged backgrounds who would be punished for 
exhibiting the same kind of "natural spirit" for which their 
elite contemporaries would be praised.60 Aggressive 
behavior of the sons of the elite was encouraged because it 
was regarded as a sign of growing manhood and readiness to 
understand and accept the code of Southern "honor." The 
white Southern elite, says Brown, reared their male children
Ibid., 172. 
Ibid., 162-163.
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to value honor as much as, if not more than, godly 
61conscience.
That did not prevent the poor white from aspiring to a 
higher social rank and leveraging what little status he had 
to define his own concept of honor and manhood. His 
opportunity came with the call to arms to defend the South 
in the spring of 1861.
Ibid., 129 and 154.
2. War and The Uses of Honor
The period leading up to and shortly following the 
shelling of Fort Sumter was marked by a highly charged 
atmosphere of euphoria and excitement throughout the South.
Representative of the mood in Central Tennessee was an
enlistment appeal broadcast in Hickman County.
We are now in a state of revolution and Southern soil 
must be defended and we should not stop to ask who 
brought about the war or who is in fault. But let us 
go and do battle for our native adopted soil and then 
settle the question as to who is to blame. Come 
forward and enroll yourselves immediately.1
By the time that this circular was issued in late May, 1861
Tennesseans were being compelled to choose between loyalty
to their state and loyalty to the Federal Government.
Typical is the comment of John Alexander Crofford of
Hardeman County who enlisted with the explanation, "I knew
but slightly of the nature of the controversy, but I was
with my country."2 George Washington Brown of McMinn
County, who served with the Lanier Dragoons, admitted, "I
1 TQ, 1737.
2 Ibid., 594.
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was not in favor of secession but I wished to go with my 
state."3
To rally the South to resist the North by force there 
had to be general agreement on war aims. Appeals to defend 
the South and Southern "honor" could therefore not be 
organized around the issue of slavery. Accordingly, those 
members of the Southern elite who shaped opinion, political 
leaders, journalists and the wealthy, all but abandoned the 
preservation of slavery as a war aim and adopted instead the 
issue of "states' rights." The ability to link "states' 
rights" and "Southern Honor," was a necessary subterfuge if 
men were going to be asked to fight, in certain instances, 
against their own economic interests. The effectiveness of 
this strategy may be seen in the comments of Sam Watkins who 
cited "states' rights" as his motivation for enlistment. 
Watkins, who enlisted as a private in Company H of the 1st 
Tennessee in early 1861, wrote some 20 years after the war,
3 Ibid., 389.
J
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I am as firm in my convictions today of the right of 
secession as I was in 1861. The South is our country/ 
the North is the country of those who live there....
We believe in the doctrine of States Rights, they in 
the doctrine of Centralization.... We only fought for 
our States Rights, they for Union and power.4
Even twenty years after the event it is clear that Sam
Watkins felt that his motives were not only reasonable but
noble and moral as well.
The Southern rallying cry of "states' rights," is an
abstract concept but for most Southern men it was an
expression which appealed to their honor and defined that
for which they were being asked to fight. The rhetoric to
spur enlistments was aimed at those emotions most central to
the non-slave owning population. If white men were going to
be asked to fight, appeals had to be made that framed the
coming war was a test of honor in which a man would be asked
to defend his home and his family. No man could be asked to
fight to defend slavery i.e. the source of wealth, power and
prestige of the planter and upper class elites.
Samuel Watkins, "CO. Aytch." Maury Grays. First 
Tennessee Regiment: or A Side Show of the Big Show 
(Nashville: Cumberland Presbyterian Publishing House, 1882),
14.
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The inhabitant of the Old South was not inspired to 
shed his own or another's blood for the right to own 
slaves. Ever since man first picked up a stone to fling 
at an enemy, he has justified his thirst for revenge 
and for popular approval on the grounds of honor. A 
close reading of Southern rhetoric on the eve of war 
should make clear the fact that white Southerners were 
certain their cause was justified by that prehistoric 
code.5
In central Tennessee, as elsewhere in the South, men
responded to rhetoric which framed the issue of war as a
question of honor in which men were asked to defend, under
the rubric of "state's rights," nothing less than their
homes and their families.
Southern whites, whether rich or poor, believed that 
the chief duty of government was the protection of 
men's property, by which honor was sustainable. 
Possessions were an essential component of personality, 
family identity, and moral position.6
For many Tennesseans, particularly those living in the 
central slave belt, the choice was simple. Washington was 
remote, irrational and in the hands of people who seemed 
intent on crushing the South's economy, institutions and 
distinctive way of life. Southern honor, that catch-all
Brown, xviii.
6 Ibid., 73.
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phrase, was under attack. The firebrands in calling men to
arms talked about "invasion," "threats to property" and
"state's rights." Russell of The London Times was on hand
in central Tennessee when the events leading to secession
were unfolding and commented,
I had no reason to think that this rebellion was the 
result of a localized energetic action on the part of a 
fierce minority in the seceding states, and that there 
was in each a large, if inert, mass opposed to 
secession, which would rally round the Stars and 
Stripes, the instant they were displayed in their 
sight. On the contrary, I met everywhere with but one 
feeling, with exceptions which prove its unanimity and 
its force. To a man the people went with their States, 
and had but one battle cry, 'States' rights, and death 
to those who make war against them!' I was fully 
satisfied in my mind also that the population of the 
South, who had taken up arms, were so convinced of the 
righteousness of their cause, and so competent to 
vindicate it, they would fight with the utmost energy 
and valor in its defense and successful 
establishment.
The popular approval of "states' rights" witnessed by 
Russell was instrumental in unifying the different social 
classes of central Tennessee and was the source of the 
homogenizing influences which were to later transform
7 William Howard Russell, My Diary - North and South 
(Boston: T.O. & H.P. Burnham, 1863), 315.
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Southern male society. As J. Dinwiddie, of Forrest's
Cavalry remembered,
They cheered us on... "Go in defense of our grand old 
Southland under the song of Dixie," the rich and poor 
alike.
Community leaders, in wildly popular public addresses,
referred to the glories of Southern honor and called on
every self-respecting man to do his duty. Dr. Christopher
Robertson who was present at one such event remembered being
inspired to volunteer. "A man patriotic enough to fight for
his country and to be a man among men has some pride." In a
society where the opinion of others was paramount, the
public oratory and supportive editorials in the Tennessee
press exerted great pressure on men to volunteer for
military service. M.D.L. Taylor, who eventually enlisted in
the 63rd Tennessee, recalled the tension and nervousness
surrounding his effort to enlist
On account of being crippled up with Rheumatism, I 
could not enlist at the beginning of the war. So I 
went to school but I could not stand it for long. In 
March of 1862 I went to the stock yards at Knoxville to 
help care for Army horses in order that I might become
TQ, 1864.
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more accustomed to outdoor life. Stayed there a month 
and enlisted in the Confederacy.
There was an almost palpable sense of war fever in
central Tennessee here described by Joshua W. Mewborn of
Fayette county: When the clarion call "to arms! To arms!"
echoed and re- echoed through the hills and vales of our
beautiful Southland, I recall with what wild enthusiasm our
young men -- the pride and chivalry of the South, -- rushed
in rapid enlistment and organization into companies, in
order to be the first to reach the field of strife.10
For Samuel David Sanders of Georgia, it was a sense of
history and tradition that played upon his sense of honor.
"I would be disgraced if I staid at home, and unworthy of my
revolutionary ancestors"11 For the young men of central
Tennessee, teenage boys actually, there was great eagerness
to enlist. Henry Jordon Rogers, 4th Tennessee Cavalry,
remembered how in Wilson County,
As a natural consequence of the excitement and 
demoralization following the breaking out of war, all
9 Ibid., 2037.
10 Ibid., 1526.
11 Brown, 35.
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schools were closed for a season and many of the young 
men left the high school and volunteered immediately 
into the Confederate army.12
Richard M. Winn, 14th Tennessee, recalled that volunteers
were also recruited by,
having meetings in different places and dinner on the 
ground. Everybody would come to eat and hear the 
speaking. So it took very little urging to get 
volunteers.13
While the concept of honor is central to explaining why 
the majority of Southern men enlisted, many impressionable 
young men also enlisted in the expectation of new 
experiences, adventure and opportunity. Some were bored 
with farming, clerking and studying and saw military service 
as a way to break the monotony. Others looked upon military 
service as a way to win social acceptance and to distinguish 
themselves in their communities.
Central Tennessee, which responded with such great 
enthusiasm to the call for secession and war with the North, 
had slave populations that, in many counties, nearly 
equalled or even exceeded that of the white population.
TQ, 1871.
Ibid., 2226.
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Included in this section were the counties of Davidson, 
Wilson, Williamson, Rutherford, Maury, Marshall, Bedford, 
Giles, Lincoln, Montgomery, Robertson, and Sumner 
counties.14 The white elites of central Tennessee were 
obviously intent on the preservation of slavery and welcomed 
the opportunity to finally strike back at the abolitionists.
These elites regarded Harriet Beecher Stowe's Uncle Tom's 
Cabin.15 and the pamphlets and published sermons of 
abolitionists as evidence of a conspiracy aimed at 
destroying the institution of slavery that was the source of 
their wealth and mainspring of the Southern society and 
economy. According to Brown and Genovese, "ownership of 
slaves and land continued to offer a distinction and moral 
imprimatur beyond their monetary value."16
The linking of the abolition of slavery and Southern 
"honor" suggests that the Southern elite, particularly the 
planter class, were convinced that an end to slavery meant
14 Bailey, 6; and Census, 456-471.
15 Harriet Beecher Stowe, Uncle Tom's Cabin; or Life 
among the Lowly. The National Era. June, 1851 to April, 1852.
16 Brown, 73 and Genovese, 18, 28 and 34.
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the loss of honor because, in their view, wealth (ownership
of slaves) and class equals honor. William Howard Russell,
special correspondent for the Times of London, who visited
the South shortly before and during the first year of the
war, saw slavery as the root cause of Southern resistance.
"The issue is to them (the southerners) one of life and
death. . . . I|17
This sentiment was expressed by The Jackson
Mississippian which argued in 1861 that the southern states
"were literally compelled to secede" or suffer dishonorable
subordination. The Southern Democrats' Vice Presidential
candidate for 1860, Joseph Lane, averred that a failure of
the South to resist Lincoln and the North would lead first
18to a loss of honor followed by the end of slavery.
Captain Charles Minor Blackford, who served in 
Tennessee in 1863 far from his native Virginia, thought that
Russell, 293.
18 Charles Royster, The Destructive War: William
Tecumseh Sherman. Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), 174.
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the issue of slavery was the single motivating reason for
Tennessee's participation in the war. He wrote to his wife:
The people in these states are not as much enlisted on 
principle in this war as we in Virginia. They regard 
it as a war to protect their property in slaves and 
when they are lost they take no further interest in it 
In Virginia we are fighting for the right to govern 
ourselves in our own way and to perpetuate our own 
customs and institutions among our own people without 
outside interference. This feeling being universal no 
loss of property or temporary defeat affects our people 
and they remain true.19
For the upper class elite of Tennessee soldiering had 
great appeal beyond the necessity for it to defend property.
Brown points out that military service was the only 
occupation that enjoyed the same prestige accorded planting 
and the planter-professions of medicine and law. Veneration 
of the warrior virtue, says Brown, reflected the more 
primitive concern of Southern elites with courage as a 
social value. The impetus for military service cut across 
class lines and was held up to popular acclaim, concludes
Susan Leigh and Charles Minor Blackford, Letters from 
Lee's Army or Memoirs of Life In and Out of the Army in 
Virginia During the War Between the States. First printed 
privately in 1894. Later edited and abridged for publication 
by Charles Minor Blackford III (New York and London: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1947), 226.
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Brown, "because it was the most efficacious means of 
exhibiting and defending personal, family, regional and 
national honor.20
The infantry was the major arm of the Confederate 
military into which the Tennessee volunteers were organized.
An individual was assigned to a company of 100 men under 
the command of a captain. In this company he was the member 
of a platoon and a mess, its smallest unit roughly 
equivalent to a squad of eight men organized for cooking and 
other purposes. Ten companies were organized into a 
regiment of 1,000 men under the command of a colonel and two 
or more regiments made up a brigade under the command of a 
brigadier general. Two or more brigades combined to make a 
division, commanded by a Major General; two or more 
divisions comprised a corps, commanded by a Lieutenant 
General; and two or more corps made an army, commanded by a 
full General.21
Brown, 191.
21 Bell I. Wiley, "The Boys of '61" chapter in Shadows 
of the Storm. Vol. I, the Images of War 1861-1865 (New York: 
Doubleday, 1981), 125-129.
A company was usually formed from the men of a 
particular town or village or cluster of villages.
Regiments, in turn, particularly at the beginning of the 
war, tended to be organized from companies from the same 
county or region of the state. In the Confederate army, it 
was common practice to concentrate regiments from the same 
state into the same brigade but, as the war continued, 
military exigencies saw brigades composed of regiments from 
different states.
Because the Tennessee volunteers at this stage of the 
war were citizens first and soldiers second, the antebellum 
concept of "honor" as a social marker, i.e. wealth plus 
class equals honor, to distinguish between the classes held 
sway. The pre-war tendency of lower class whites to defer 
to their betters can be observed in the elections that the 
organizing volunteer regiments held to select officers.
With rare exception, the upper class elite were selected for 
every significant position of authority above the rank of 
captain.
The significance of these elections that made them 
different from general elections for public office was that
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the very act of organizing military units brought men from 
the same area of different social classes together and 
placed them in positions of mutual dependency. The white 
elites in command positions learned quickly to be sensitive 
to the attitudes of the poor whites in the ranks. Lower 
class whites who regarded themselves as good as any man 
despite their subordinate position, learned to adjust to 
accepting commands from representatives of a class from 
which they were excluded.
Given the strong independent streak of the average 
Southern soldier, the Confederate military structure that 
evolved had to find a means to channel this free spirit 
without totally sacrificing the order and discipline 
necessary for military success. There was in the 
Confederate military throughout the war, a taut balance 
between concessions to individualism and the needs of 
discipline. Confederate success on the battlefield was due, 
in part, because the men, enlisted and officers, organized 
themselves into social units that, for all intents and 
purposes, replicated the extended family structure from 
which they came. And, as in all extended families, there
developed mutual dependency, affection and identity with, 
important in the South, the honor of the family name. There 
were, then, two entirely different but equally powerful 
concepts of "honor" shaping the Southern fighting man.
There was the force of personal honor and its association 
with duty and manhood. Added to this was the pressure 
stemming from identification with and defense of the 
military family and its honor. Thus, in the context of a 
military structure that was patriarchal and fraternal, honor 
was the cement that bound men to one another. Personal 
honor meant that every man would strive to perform to the 
expectations of every other man with whom he was connected.
For an individual soldier to willfully do less than what 
was expected or to perform poorly in soldierly tasks, could 
result in a collective lowered opinion of that soldier and a 
corresponding loss of his manhood. The other honor, what 
some would call the honor of the regiment, actually family 
honor, meant that men fought from the needs rising from 
mutual dependency, affinities and even affection. These 
twin forces of honor may explain why they fought so long and 
so hard for a cause in which many had no personal stake.
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Honor, and by extension, duty and manhood, was the driving 
force of Confederate arms and an all but hidden source of 
power of the antebellum elite who chose to wage war to 
defend their way of life.
The emergence of these concepts of honor meant that the
antebellum notions of honor were transformed. The
democratization and homogenization of white southern males 
occasioned by the war provided new emphases in the 
definitions of honor which de-emphasized and to a great 
extent eliminated the excesses and expectations of deference 
and paternalism between the white classes. For the war 
generation of white southern males, the performance of duty 
in the Southern cause, and its many associations with 
manhood and fraternal loyalty, was to become the new and 
compelling marker for honor. It was a concept that embraced
both an individual and community understanding and
acceptance of honor and one which helped to sustain support 
for the "lost cause" by creating the myth of white equality.
Honor became the very essence of manhood regardless of 
social class, rank or wealth. Honor meant recognizing and
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having done your duty as that duty was defined by Southern 
society.
The three Tennessee regiments that formed the core of 
what was to become Archer's Tennessee Brigade in 1862 were 
sworn into state service in May, 1861 and shortly thereafter 
organized into the Tennessee brigade. The first regiment 
sworn into state service was the 1st Tennessee Volunteer 
Infantry that had at its center the three companies of the 
"Rock City Guards" formed in Nashville shortly before Fort 
Sumter was captured. They were joined by companies 
organized in adjoining counties and, with their band, 
constituted a military unit of well over 1100 men.22
The 7th Tennessee was sworn into state service on May 
20, 1861 at Camp Trousdale in Sumner County. At its core 
were six companies from Wilson county supplemented by two 
companies from Sumner county and one each from Smith and 
DeKalb counties. The 7th was to have the distinction of
The other companies came from Williamson, Maury, 
Giles and Rutherford counties. John B. Lindsley, Ed. 
Military Annals of Tennessee: Confederate (Nashville: J.M.
Lindsley and Co. Publishing, 1886), 156.
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being the first regiment to leave Camp Trousdale to fight in
, , 23the war.
The 14th Tennessee was sworn into state service on May- 
17, 1861 at Camp Duncan near Clarksville, in south central 
Tennessee and moved shortly thereafter to Camp Quarles near 
the Tennessee/Kentucky border. This regiment was organized 
around companies recruited in the southernmost counties of 
central Tennessee.24
Tennessee did not have a military institute and had 
earlier abolished the institution of the militia with a 
resulting lack of trained officers to lead these volunteer 
regiments.25 The few professionals who were available, 
primarily retired and some recently resigned from active 
Federal service, quickly signed up with the first regiments 
being organized. The 1st Tennessee, for example, was 
commanded by George Maney, a veteran of the Mexican War, and
23 Ibid., 227.
24 Mockbee, 1-3.
2 5 Richard McMurray, Two Great Rebel Armies (Chapel
Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 
81.
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included among its other officers a former member of the 
U.S. Navy and three graduates of the Western Military 
Institute in Kentucky. Within a year most of these 
officers, because of their prior military experience, would 
be asked to help organize and lead other Confederate 
regiments. Maney, for example, was transferred and 
promoted to the rank of General.26 The other regiments, as 
noted, recruited their officers from prominent members of 
the local community. Congressman Robert Hatton was elected 
colonel of the 7th Tennessee and Stewart College professor 
William A. Forbes, a graduate of the Virginia Military 
Institute, was selected to lead the 14th Tennessee.27 The
"Sewanee Tennessee - The University of the South," 
CV, February, 1895, 55; "Number of Confederate Generals," CV, 
April, 1896, 239; "Sketches of U.C.V. officials," CV,
September, 1898, 434; Obituary of Maj . Albert Wynne Harris,
CV, October, 1898, 485; Obituary of Dr. W.L. Nichol, CV,
June, 1901, 2 78; Emory Holmes, "Monument to Gen. R.E. Lee in
Memphis," CV, June, 1904, 268; Obituary of Maj. Joseph
Vaulx, CV, April, 1908, 192xxv; obituary of Col. R.B.
Snowden, CV, November, 1909, 568; Obituary of Lt. Charles H. 
King, CV, March, 1911, 130; Dr. Charles W. Miles, "Col. Hume 
R. Feild," CV, September, 1921, 325-326; Obituary of Judge
H.H. Cook, CV, February, 1922, 266; TQ, 1854.
27 Robert Mockbee, "Heroes in the last charge of Lee's
Army," CV January, 1898, 31; "Officials of Seventh Tennessee 
Regiment," CV, November, 1898, 528; Obituary of Lieut. Col.
Nathan Brandon, CV, January, 1899, 33; F.S. Harris, "Maj.
./
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subordinate officers of these regiments were also drawn from
the antebellum social elite. One of the captains assigned
to the 7th Tennessee was John A. Fite who, prior to the war,
practiced law with his brother, Judge Fite. Other company
officers included First Lieutenant John Allen who was the
2 8son of a U.S. Congressman.
For the young volunteers who were eager to be tested in
battle, the training camps were a purgatory. London Times
journalist Russell inspected a regiment of these raw
Tennessee recruits in mid-June 1861.
Many of these men were in their shirt sleeves and the 
awkwardness with which they handled their arms showed 
that, however good they might be as shots, they were 
bad hands at manual platoon exercise; but such great 
strapping fellows, that as I walked down the ranks 
there were few whose shoulders were not above the level 
of my head, excepting here and there a weedy old man or 
a growing lad. They were armed with old pattern 
percussion muskets, no two clad alike, many were badly 
shod, few with knapsacks, but all provided with a tin
George A. Howard," CV, January, 1910, 37-38; John P. Hickman, 
"Confederate Generals of Tennessee," CV, April, 1910, 171;
Obituary of Ben A. Haskins, CV, September, 1912, 439; "The
Last of the Line," CV, May, 1915, 208; Obituary of General
William McComb, CV, September, 1918, 404; Obituary of Robert 
Mockbee, CV, October, 1922, 3 90 and Lindsley, 227.
28 "Five Daughters of Capt. John C. Allen," CV, 
November, 1901, 4 95; Obituary of John A. Fite, CV, August,
1926, 306; TQ, 816, 1305 and 1654.
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water-flask and a blanket. The officers were plain, 
farmerly planters, merchants, lawyers and the like -- 
energetic, determined men, but utterly ignorant of the 
most rudimentary parts of the military science. It is 
this want of knowledge on the part of the officer which 
renders it so difficult to arrive at a tolerable 
condition of discipline among volunteers, as the 
privates are quite well aware they know as much of 
soldiering as the great majority of their officers.29
The first commander of the brigade that was to become
Archer's Tennessee Brigade was Samuel Read Anderson,
president of the "Old" Bank of Tennessee and prominent
veteran of the Mexican War in which he attained the rank of
lieutenant colonel. Anderson was appointed a brigadier
general in the Provisional Army of the Confederacy on July
9, 1861 and, four days later, organized the 1st, 7th and
14th Tennessee regiments into a brigade under his command.30
Russell, 311-312.
30 War of the Rebellion. Official Records of the Union 
and Confederate Armies. cited hereafter as O.R., series I, 
vol. II, 998, 1001-1002; vol. IV, 370; John P. Hickman,
"Confederate Generals of Tennessee, 1 CV, April, 1910, 171 and 
John M. Bright, "He knew where to get milk and hoecake, " CV, 
December, 1912, 573; Marcus J. Wright, General Officers of
the Confederate Army (New York: the Neale Publishing Company, 
1911), 54-55; Robert Mockbee, 6. Mockbee does not specify
which regiment that Anderson served in but I think that there 
was only one.
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In the summer of 1861 the Tennessee regiments of the
newly organized brigade were ordered to move east to
Manassas, Virginia to join the Confederate army of General
P.G.T. Beauregard. The trains could not roll fast enough
for the Tennesseans who, after enduring months of tedious
drill, feared that they would miss out on was widely
expected to be the first and only "glorious" battle of the
war. For these Tennesseans, it was a question of pride and
honor that they be present at the battle. This led many of
them who might otherwise have been left behind at camp to go
to extremes to be with their units when they were sent
forward. One such example was witnessed by Sergeant Mockbee
of the 14th Tennessee.
Most feared that the great impending battle would be 
fought; our independence gained and the war ended 
without the regiment having an opportunity to fire a 
gun.... Sick men forgot the measles and heedless of 
warnings from homefolks and doctors alike; more than 4 0 
of the poor shadows of men whose legs fairly wobbled as 
they walked boarded the midnight train and started (for 
the battle.) 31
If was the fate of these Tennessee soldiers to arrive on the 
battlefield shortly after victory had been secured. They
31 Mockbee, 3.
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rejoiced at the triumph of Confederate arms but lamented
their absence in making it possible. They had neither heard
nor fired a shot in anger and their chance for glory,
remembers Private Watkins, had been denied.
Everyone was wild, nay frenzied with the excitement of 
victory and we felt ... that the war was over, and we 
would have to return home without even seeing a Yankee 
soldier. Ah, how we envied those that were wounded.
We thought at the time that we would have given a 
thousand dollars to have been in the battle, and to 
have had our arm shot off, so we could have returned 
home with an empty sleeve. But the battle was over, 
and we (were) left out.32
What is remarkable is Watkins' sorrow at having missed the
opportunity for a crippling wound which he wanted as a sign
that he had fulfilled his duty and met the demands of honor
and manhood.
The Tennessee Brigade was subsequently ordered to the 
Cheat Mountain region of West Virginia to reinforce the 
Confederate forces fighting there to dislodge a large 
Federal force defending the break-away state. The area to 
which they were sent was sparsely inhabited and largely 
undeveloped in terms of roads, bridges and communications.
32 Watkins, 15-16.
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It was excellent defensive terrain for the Federals. Adding
to the problems of the Confederates was an incessant rain
which kept the men in a state of perpetual cold and
dampness. Peter Kin of the 21st Virginia, recalled, "We
camped on Valley Mountain (near Cheat Mountain) 43 days and
it rained 3 7 days out of that number."33 The Tennesseans
were to spend all of autumn on Valley Mountain.
Because of the conditions of terrain and climate to
which they were unaccustomed, the Cheat Mountain campaign
was particularly arduous for the Tennesseans. Sam Watkins
remembered vividly the initial march of the brigade from its
temporary camp in Staunton, Virginia across the mountains
into West Virginia:
I was on every march that was ever made by the First 
Tennessee Regiment during the whole war, and at this 
time I cannot remember or ever experienced a harder or 
more fatiguing march... From the foot to top of the 
mountain, soldiers lined the road, broken and 
exhausted.34
Jack Zinn, Robert E. Lee's Cheat Mountain Campaign
(Parsons WV: McClain Printing Company, 1974), 93.
34 Watkins, 17.
Sergeant Mockbee remembered that the men quickly used up 
their food and water supplies and re-supply was complicated 
by the weather and poor road conditions. The men were 
thirsty, hungry and exhausted by the difficult march through 
and over the mountains. Many men were physically worn out 
by the rigors of the march and fell victim to a variety of 
ailments. They were learning that the trials of war meant 
more than just facing the enemy in battle. Going to war 
also meant adjusting to and surmounting the hardships 
attendant to campaigning under difficult conditions and with 
inadequate supplies of food and clothing. The effect of 
this hard service was to harden the men for the even more 
difficult times that lie ahead and to sort out who was up to 
the job of soldiering. The men were learning that the 
soldierly dictates of honor and duty not only meant the 
ability to meet the enemy unflinchingly but also to endure 
long marches, short rations and the possibility of death 
through disease.35
35 Robert E. Lee wrote of the effects of hard 
campaigning on one regiment, 6th North Carolina, of this 
little army. "I well recall the fact that a regiment of NC 
Vol.s, under Col. Lee, that reported with one-thousand 
effective men, was in a short time reduced to one-third of
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The goal of the Confederate offensive at Cheat Mountain 
was the capture of the Federal force entrenched on Cheat 
Mountain itself. It was a complex plan in which Anderson's 
Brigade would be employed as a blocking force to cut off 
either the retreat or reinforcement of the Federals. The 
actual plan miscarried and the Confederate offensive was 
aborted shortly after its launch. The Tennesseans had been 
primed for a major test of their fighting ability and blamed 
the Virginians in command of the operation for its failure.
The men of the Tennessee brigade saw some action in a 
fitful and indecisive skirmish with a Federal force they had 
encountered by accident. Despite the action's brevity and
its original strength, without ever having been under fire. 
Though not to the same extent, the other commands were all 
seriously reduced by disease...." Walter H. Taylor, four 
Years with Lee (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1877), 17.
Mockbee blamed the problem of disease on an inefficient 
Confederate medical department. However inefficient that 
Department may have been, the truth is that the magnitude of 
the problem was simply beyond the two physicians assigned to 
each regiment. This led to volunteer nurses from the ranks 
being assigned to the job as well as physicians such as 
private Deering Roberts, 1st Tennessee and Chaplain (and 
physician) Quintard. TQ, 1854 and Charles Todd Quintard, 
Doctor Quintard. Chaplain. CSA and Second Bishop of 
Tennessee; Being his story of the War (1861-1865). Arthur 
Noll Ed., (Sewanee: The University Press, 1905), 17.
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inconsequential exchange of fire, some of the brigade's
officers acted less than heroically which later made them
the butts of derision among the enlisted men. In any event,
the men of the brigade felt cheated at the loss of another
opportunity to win battlefield glory.36 A week later, J.R.
Buist, 1st Tennessee, in a letter to a relative, summed up
the bitterness of feeling concerning the aborted attack.
Well, at the end of seven day's marching and starvation 
we returned (to our original position) the whole affair 
having proved a failure... chiefly from old fogyism 
and want of pluck among the Virginians. Never were men 
more sick of Virginia and Virginians than we are."37
Buist's indictment, aimed at the upper class elites in
charge of the operation, is a small indicator that the old
social hierarchy of the antebellum South was being tested
and found wanting. Private Watkins looking around after the
smoke from the skirmish had cleared mocked the behavior of
his superiors under fire.
36 Armistead L. Long, Memoirs of Robert E . Lee (New York 
and Philadelphia: J.M. Stoddart and Co., 1886), 123-124;
O.R., series I, vol. V, 191; Lindsley, 228; Zinn, 160-161; 
Watkins, 20; Quintard, 22.
37 Buist, J.R., National Intelligencer. "Letter to his 
Uncle" (22 Nov, 1861), 2, col. 3.
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After all the fighting was over, where, o where was all 
the fine rigging heretofore on our officers? They 
could not be seen. Corporals, Sergeants, Lieutenants, 
Captains, all had torn the fine lace off their
clothing......  I asked several of them why they had
torn off the insignia of their rank, and they always 
answered, "Humpf, you think that I was going to be a 
target for the Yankees to shoot at?"38
Regardless of their rank, the men of the brigade
discovered that the reality of war was far different from
what they had come to expect. Many men suffering from
wounds and illness and exhausted by the hard campaigning
were given medical discharges to return to their homes to
recover. They were expected to return to service when
restored to full health. Some of these men may have had
sham reasons for leaving their units but all sought official
documentation for the sake of their personal honor. Many of
those discharged or furloughed back to Tennessee for medical
reasons rejoined their old unit in Virginia if they could.
For others, though, once they had recovered at home it was
easier, and perhaps preferable, to join a unit in Tennessee
rather than travel hundreds of miles back to Virginia.
Watkins, 21.
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Major Nathan Brandon, for example, was furloughed from
the 1st Tennessee to recuperate at his home in Clarkesville,
Tennessee. While there, he left his sick bed to participate
in the defense of Fort Donelson. He was captured,
subsequently paroled and rejoined a Confederate Army unit
which spent the rest of the war in the western theater.39
In this early stage of the war it was somewhat easier
to get an honorable discharge from service for a wound than
would be the case when Confederate manpower needs became
pressing. Mockbee relates who one of his fellow soldiers
got his discharge by virtue of being grazed by a cannon
ball. He suggests that later in the war it would take much
more than that to get a release from active service:
W.H. Frazier ... was sitting near the fire in front of 
his tent when a rifle shell from the enemy's ( 
artillery) across the River fell near the (campfire) 
"Ricocheted" going through the tent- took frazier a 
side swipe across the face and knocking him into the 
fire and but for the timely assistance of Lieut. L.W.
Lewis he would have been badly burned......  the poor
fellow though soon found his voice and hastily begged 
to be taken to his "Mother, " it all resultied in Frazier 
getting a discharge as at that stage of the War the 
simple fact of a man's having been grazed by a cannon
Obituary of Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Brandon, CV, 
January, 1899, 33.
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Ball, was quite sufficient to (result in) an honorable
discharge.40
Other unhappy soldiers, a distinct minority, found 
illness or minor wounds a convenient way to leave the 
military service and simply sat out the rest of the war. 
Those who remained on active duty, together with those who 
returned to their units following recovery from wounds or as 
exchanged prisoners of war, were part of the strong fabric 
created by regimental and brigade cohesion.41
The Tennesseans concluded their service in West 
Virginia with participation in a winter offensive under the 
overall command of Major General T. J. "Stonewall" Jackson.
The campaign achieved its goals with little loss of life
Mockbee, 15-16. Mockbee added in addition an 
anecdote of the man's later life. Frazier apparently, later 
got in to trouble between the lines and killed a Federal 
soldier. He was tried in a federal court but was acquitted.
Frazier claimed that on account of his head wound he was 
quite insane.
41 Obituary of Captain DeWitt Anderson, CV, September, 
1902, 420; Obituary of Judge H.H. Cook, CV, February, 1922,
68; TQ, 1547 and 1741; Lindsley, 157, "Sketches of U.C.V. 
Officials, Dr. James Park Hanner, Tennessee," CV, September, 
1898, 434; Obituary of Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Brandon, CV, 
January, 1899, 33; Charles W. Miles, "Col. Hume R. Feild,"
CV, September, 1921, 325-326.
but was remembered by the Tennesseans because of the
42suffering caused by the extreme winter weather. At the 
conclusion of this offensive, the brigade was ordered east 
to join the main army of General Joseph Johnson. There had 
been some dissension among the Tennessee officers on the 
quality of Jackson's generalship and a decision was made to 
reorganize the Tennessee brigade, in effect, to break it up.
The 1st Tennessee Regiment Volunteers was sent west to join 
General Albert Sidney Johnson's army at Corinth,
Mississippi. The 7th and 14th Tennessee Regiments were 
ordered east to Fredericksburg, Virginia where they were 
reinforced with the 1st Tennessee Infantry Regiment 
Confederate, commanded by Colonel Peter Turney, that, at the 
start of the war, had gone directly into service with the 
Provisional Army of the Confederacy. Like the regiment it 
replaced it had been organized in central Tennessee and had 
not seen any major action. These three regiments, the 1st 
Tennessee Confederate, 7th and 14th Tennessee Volunteers,
42 O.R., series I, vol. V, 289,460 and 982; Lindsley,
158; Mockbee, 14; Watkins, 23. According to Watkins, the 
Tennesseans took to calling General Jackson "Tom Fool" in 
loud voices when ever they saw him.
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subsequently became the core of the Tennessee brigade 
commanded successively by Anderson, Hatton and Archer.
As the brigade marched to Manassas in February, 1862 to 
Fredericksburg, they learned of the fall of Fort Donelson 
and the occupation of central Tennessee, their home, by 
Federal forces. From this point on, the men of the 
Tennessee Brigade were to become an "orphan brigade" cut off 
from their source of supplies and replacements.
The brigade was soon ordered to Yorktown, Virginia 
where it participated in a series of minor battles in which, 
for the most part, they were held in reserve. Their test of 
fire was to come at the battle of Seven Pines. Seven Pines 
was destined to be the brigade's first exposure to the real 
horrors of war. From that experience would emerge the 
veterans who, conditioned by the dictates of Southern honor, 
would later march without question toward certain death at 
Gettysburg.
3. War and the meaning of Honor
The three Tennessee regiments of the newly re-organized 
brigade had been in existence for nearly a year when the 
Confederate Congress passed the Conscription Act in April, 
1862. In addition to making military service mandatory for 
all white males, the Conscription Act required that the 
original volunteers, who had enlisted for a fixed period of 
service, to serve beyond the expiration of that service. As 
compensation for this change in service status, the 
Confederate Congress allowed men already on active duty to 
re-elect their officers.
Unlike the earlier election back home, the men of the 
Tennessee regiments chose individuals for command positions 
on the basis of proven merit and ability rather than their 
social status in the local community. The influence of 
slave owning elites began to erode as individuals of more 
modest background were chosen for command positions. In 
their selection of new officers, the Tennesseans were 
heavily influenced by the experiences of the first year of 
the war particularly the behavior of their officers during
71 j
72
the Cheat Mountain campaign. Sergeant Mockbee remembered
that in the 14th Tennessee,
...-there was many changes made in commisioned officers 
of the dif(f)erent companies. Many new men being 
promoted from the ranks and many who had held 
commissions before were let out. (A)nd they almost
without exception left the Regiment most of them going 
to the Western army'1
For the first time, individuals from non-slave owning
backgrounds were moving into the upper echelons of command.
An example of this type of social mobility in the 7th
Tennessee was the election of William McComb, a non-slave
owning middle class millwright who advanced from the rank of
lieutenant in 1861 to the rank of major as a result of the
new elections.
For the men of the Tennessee brigade, the spring of
1862 began with their involvement in a series of engagements
in eastern coastal Virginia which were later to be known as
the Peninsula campaign. As part of his strategy of
maneuver and envelopment aimed at the capture of Richmond,
Federal general George McClellan landed a force at Eltham's
Landing on the York River with the object of flanking
1 Mockbee, 19-20.
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Williamsburg 20 miles to the southeast.2 The Tennessee 
Brigade, under Anderson's command, was among the units sent 
by Johnston to counter the Federal move. The resulting 
engagement was to cost Anderson his job as brigade 
commander.
The task of the Tennessee Brigade at Eltham's Landing 
was to cover the exposed left flank of Hood's Texas Brigade 
which had advanced too quickly on the Federal force.
Anderson unwisely moved forward with his soldiers in column 
formation and thereby weakened the entire Confederate 
attack. The brigade's subordinate officers only barely 
managed under the intense Federal fire to reorganize the 
regiments into a line formation. Had the Federals 
counterattacked, they would probably have collapsed the
Douglas S. Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in
Command (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943-1944), vol.
I, 193-195; R.U. Johnson and C.C. Buel, Eds. Battles and 
Leaders of the Civil War (New York: Century Magazine, 1893), 
cited hereafter as B & L, vol. II, 172-173 and 221-222; O.R., 
series I, vol. II, part I, 616. This was Brigadier General 
William B. Franklin's Division, which had landed on the 
morning of the seventh of May.
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entire Confederate flank.3 Mockbee recalled the incident 
years later,
(T)he Yankees received our advanced head of column with 
a volley which ... threw the whole of the Fourteenth 
Tenn. Regt. into such confusion that it took the 
officers sometime to straighten them out and form with 
the other Regiments a line of Battle. Which was 
something Genl. Anderson didn't seem to know anything 
about.4
Following this engagement Anderson journeyed to 
Richmond and resigned from the army. He was replaced on May 
23, 1862 as brigade commander by Colonel Robert Hatton, 
commander of the 7th Tennessee and a former U.S. 
Congressman.5 The Confederates retreated toward Richmond
O.R. , series I, vol. XI, part I, 627 and 629-630. 
Mockbee, 20-21; June Kimble, "June Kimble Papers"
(unpublished reminiscences, Eleanor S. Brockenbrough Library, 
Museum of the Confederacy).
4 Mockbee, 20-21. Mockbee goes on to say that "(t)he 
men made the excuse for the General that his military 
experience in Mexico consisted in charging through narrow 
streets of the towns 'end fore most and that he didn't know 
how to fight in the open country."
5 John P. Hickman, "Confederate Generals of Tennessee," 
CV, April, 1910, 171; Southern Historical Society, Southern
Historical Society Papers. 52 volumes, (Richmond: Virginia
Historical Society, 1876-1959), Vol. I, A-46. S.R. Anderson 
returned to Tennessee and in late 1864 he accepted a 
commission as a brigadier general in the Confederate army 
again. Hatton, who was junior to Peter Turney of the 1st
J
and the brigade, now Hatton's Tennessee Brigade, was made 
part of the rear guard protecting the main army.
The Federal offensive to take Richmond involved the 
simultaneous thrust of McClellan's men from the east and 
another Federal army under Major General Irving McDowell 
driving down from the north against the Confederate capitol.
While he waited for word that McDowell was moving south 
from Fredericksburg, McClellan halted his army near an area 
called Seven Pines, some ten miles east of Richmond. The 
Confederate command realized that the time for a 
counteroffensive was at hand before the two advancing 
Federal armies united.6 On May 30, the Confederates struck.
In the surprise attack on the Federal force at Seven 
Pines, Hatton's Brigade was placed in reserve and assigned 
the task of protecting the left flank of the Confederate 
army. The Tennesseans had not been involved in the first 
day's attack and were probably wondering whether this was
Tennessee, probably owed his promotion to his former position 
as a U.S. Congressman.
6 B & L, vol. II, 175 and 211.
7 Ibid., 212.
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another battle which they would somehow miss when a courier 
from the Confederate command found it in the late afternoon 
on May 31. As Private H. T. Childs, 1st Tennessee, later 
recalled,
At one bound Hatton was in his saddle. He was informed 
that General Johnson wanted either the Tennessee 
Brigade or Brigadier General Wade Hampton's Brigade to 
occupy a certain place in the line. Hatton replied, 
"I'll beat Hampton;' and gave the command, 'Forward, 
double quick!' As we moved we passed President
g
Jefferson Davis and saluted him with the Rebel Yell. 
Darkness was approaching as Hatton moved his men 
forward unsure of the exact location of either the enemy or 
the friendly forces which he was supposed to assist. The 
initial Confederate attack in this part of the line had 
begun with the assumption that the Federal force being 
engaged was of brigade strength. Actually, the Confederates 
had attacked a Federal division, were repulsed and had taken 
heavy losses. The Tennesseans were thus advancing to 
support an attack that had already failed and would soon 
find themselves in harm's way against a highly motivated and
O.R., series I, vol. XI, part 1, 989; H.T. Childs,
"Reminiscences of Harris and Hatton," CV, March, 1900, 111-
112 .
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numerically superior opponent.9 As the brigade, with its 
enthusiastic commander Hatton urging it on, passed before 
President Davis who was on the battlefield, Davis is reputed 
to have remarked, "it moves in handsomely but it will lose 
its commander."10 Davis' prophecy proved to be correct.
It was almost dark when Hatton, astride his horse 'Old 
Ball', approached the Federal line. He had earlier given 
the order to load weapons and now commanded "fix bayonets."
Hatton rode just to the rear of the center colors and was 
waving his hat when, at 50 yards, the Federals unleashed a 
volley of fire which ripped into the advancing Tennessee 
line.11 The Tennesseans recoiled from the sheet of fire and 
scores of men fell including Hatton who, with his mount, was 
killed instantly. He had been a general for all of eight 
days.12 Division commander Major General G. W. Smith who
9 B & L, vol. II, 215.
10 Peter Turney, "Judge Turney on Mr. Davis: The 
Jurist's Opinion of the Fallen Chieftain," CV, January, 1893, 
15.
11 H.T. Childs, "Reminiscences of Harris and Hatton," 
CV, March, 1900, 112.
12 Hal Manson, "Letter from Hal Manson to widow of 
Robert Hatton," CV, January, 1900, 34.
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accompanied the Tennesseans to the front and was next to
Hatton when he was killed recalled that the opposing lines
were so close to one another that in some places they were
not more than 2 5 yards apart.13
Within three minutes the Tennessee Brigade lost 243 men
to the unrelenting fire. Among the dead were the commander
of the 1st Tennessee and a regimental surgeon killed while
attempting to save the life of a wounded man.14 Richard
Beard, 7th Tennessee, who was severely wounded in this
battle and later fought at Chickamauga and the Battle of
Atlanta, had no doubt as to the most violent battle. Seven
Pines, he recounted,
gives a better conception of Hell than any that I have 
passed through afterwards. I passed through a number 
of battles but I never experienced anything like this 
first battle. I never saw men fall around me as fast 
as they did there. I was wounded three times almost 
before I could turn around.15
B Sc L, Vol. II, 247.
14 O.R., series I, vol. XI, part 2, 506. The exact
casualties were 43 killed, 187 wounded and 13 missing.; H.T. 
Childs, "The Battle of Seven Pines," CV, January, 1917, 20.
15 TQ, 299.
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G.W. Lamberson, 7th Tennessee, had an especially gory reason
to recall the battle.
I was at the battle of (Seven Pines) and we was in the 
woods and the yankes commenced shooting cannons at us 
and we was orderd to lay down. Me and Ches Chatmon was 
laying down side by side and a cannon ball hit 
Chatmon's hed and sholders and tore it off and throd 
meat in my face.16
Darkness brought a halt to the fighting and the 
battered men of the Tennessee Brigade were pulled back. The 
Tennesseans had finally performed their duty as soldiers. 
Many of them, like Robert Hatton, attained "immortalizing 
valor" through their performance on the battlefield. For 
others, just to have withstood the horror and demands of the 
battle, was testimony to their courage, manliness, self­
esteem and commitment to their sacred vow to defend home and 
country. More simply, they had behaved in accordance with 
the code of Southern honor. Given the enormity of their 
losses in this first battle, including the death of their 
commander, this concept of honor becomes crucial to 
understanding why these Tennesseans, and men like them from 
other Southern states, were able to survive the reality of
Ibid., 1320.
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war and to continue to fight until the collapse of the 
Confederacy in April, 1865. It was honor, not patriotism or 
discipline, that formed them as soldiers and shaped their 
behavior in battle.17
17 Both Read Mitchell and Gerald Linderman saw a 
soldier's first battle as a rite of passage from recruit to 
veteran. Mitchell wrote of "the soldier's initiation into 
large-scale horror" while Linderman, who equated courage with 
manhood, argued that manhood could only be tested in battle; 
"Few Civil War soldiers felt able simply to declare their own 
courage. No man knew how he would behave in battle, Ulysses 
Grant's aide, Horace Porter, insisted, so courage was never 
assured until it had been put to trial. Critical to the 
soldier's Civil War was his willingness to expose himself in 
a direct test of his mettle against that of the enemy." Read 
Mitchell, Civil War Soldiers: their Expectations and their
Experiences (New York: Viking Press, 1988), 75 and Gerald F.
Linderman, Embattled Courage; The Experience of Combat in the 
American Civil War (New York and London: Macmillan, Inc.,
1987), 20.
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Following the battle of Seven Pines, Lee reorganized
the Confederate Army and placed, as far as possible,
professional officers in command. One such example was
James Jay Archer of Maryland, a captain of the regular Army
18who resigned his commission to join the Confederacy. Lee 
assigned him on June 3, to replace the fallen Hatton as 
commander of the Tennessee brigade. Added to the Brigade, 
to make up for losses suffered at Seven Pines, were the 5th 
Alabama Battalion and 19th Georgia Regiment. The Brigade 
was thus re-constituted and called "Archer's Brigade." As 
Archer's Brigade the Tennessee brigade took an active part 
in every important engagement of Lee's Army of Northern 
Virginia until its surrender at Appomattox. Its important
See C. Van Woodward, editor, Mary Chesnut's Civil War 
(New Haven: Yale Press, 1981), for some interesting comments 
on Archer. Shortly after his parole from Johnson's Island 
prison in Ohio where he had been taken after his capture at 
Gettysburg, Archer called on the Chesnuts. The always 
observant diarist noted, in her August 6, 1864 entry, "Archer 
was a classmate of my husband's at Princeton College. They 
called him Sally Archer then. He was so girlish and pretty.
No trace of feminine beauty about this grim soldier now. He 
has a hard face, black-bearded, sallow, with the saddest
black eyes......  He is abstracted, weary-looking - mind and
body - deadened by long imprisonment." Archer was to die 
within six months largely due to the general weakening of his 
constitution from his prison stay.
j
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engagements were to include, after Seven Pines, the Seven
Days battles; Cedar Mountain, Second Manassas, Sharpsburg,
Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, the
Wilderness, Spotsylvania Courthouse, Cold Harbor, Petersburg
and, finally, Appomattox Court House. It was with
considerable pride that Robert Mockbee, 14th Tennessee,
recounted these battles as
evidence of some of the more important service rendered 
by what was ever afterwards known as Archer's Tennessee 
Brigade as part of A.P. Hill's Light Division. It will 
suffice to show the high position the Brigade held in 
the estimation of Generals Lee, Jackson and Hill.19
The attributes of Southern honor, as they evolved in
the Civil War, gave rise to the myth of the special virtue
of the Southern soldier as described by Read Mitchell in
Civil War Soldiers: their Expectations and their Experiences
(New York: Viking Press, 1988).
The Confederate soldier became a folk hero because of 
his bravery and endurance, and this heroic myth had a 
basis in fact. Many Confederate soldiers had been 
volunteers; volunteers are more likely to stand the 
hardships of war. Furthermore, the very hardships 
themselves and the mixture of pride and resentment they 
produced set soldiers apart from the civilian 
population. This feeling, combined with the shared 
dangers of battle and hardships of the march, helped
Mockbee, 22.
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produce the Confederate soldier's "esprit de corps."
His suffering proved his patriotism and thus raised his 
self esteem.20
Mitchell's characterization of the Confederate soldier 
captures the essence of Bertram Brown's description of the 
southern code of honor to which these men subscribed, namely 
"immortalizing valor," the opinion of others as a measure of 
self worth, characteristics of manliness and reliance upon 
oath-taking.21 These attributes of honor were constantly 
present in the evolution of the men of the Tennessee brigade 
from raw volunteers to battle hardened soldiers to the 
unreconstructed veterans of a lost cause.
Robert Hatton, who fell leading the brigade into its 
first significant battle at Seven Pines, has been largely 
forgotten by modern historians of the Civil War. His name 
is evoked frequently, however, in the Tennessee 
Questionnaires by veterans of the Tennessee brigade and 
other units. His name appears in the company of such 
figures as Robert E. Lee, "Stonewall" Jackson, A.P. Hill and
2 n Mitchell, 172.
21 Brown, 34.
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other notables of that period.22 The preservation of
Hatton's memory by so many Tennessee veterans underscores
the enduring significance of "immortalizing honor" achieved
by Hatton through his death at Seven Pines.
The influence of "immortalizing valor" on behavior is
linked, of course, to honor's other attributes of manliness
and self esteem derived from the good opinion of others.
Immortalizing valor, as an attribute of honor, represented
how the soldier wanted to see himself and to be regarded and
remembered by others. What finer compliment could George
Washington Lewis give his former captain, Ate Hill, than "a
fine specimen of Southern Chivalry. He was killed at
Gettysburg. 1,23 Looking back at his service for the
Confederacy from the vantage point of another century,
Tennessee veteran W.R.H. Mathews wrote,
No I never think it a burden to give any information I 
can about the Confederate Soldier, I deam it a 
privalede. The world will never again see these equal 
in arms, the great war in Europe had its Pershane its 
clever Yank but the south had its thousands of them and 
fare and above all it had its Robt. E. Lee, and 
Jackson, the rebels if you call them so fought naked
22 TQ, 18.
23 Ibid., 1357.
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and hungry against great odds without hope of pay 
because he was the best blood in the world and for a 
great principle he beleaved right and for humanity good 
and because he new Bob Lee lead him. The world will be 
the poore when this thin line disappears for it will 
see no equal no moore. I was only a humble one among 
this host of heroes.24
Stripped of its imagery, the statement is emblematic of
Mathews' sense of "immortalizing valor" by virtue of his
honorable service in the Confederacy, "a humble one among
this host of heroes." Men remembered not only their own
service but that rendered by others like John Alexander
whose narrative recalled the contribution of one simple
soldier.
I desire here to mention the death of one of our poor 
comrades, who deserves mention and to be put on the 
Honor Roll, having made the supreme sacrafice - his 
name - Tom Arnold.... 25
Robert Mockbee also evokes "immortalizing valor" in his
commemoration of the deeds of three men who died at the
height of Pickett's Charge,
The waving battle flags seemed to be the special mark 
as soon as we cane in range of the small arms, three 
men being shot with the colors of the Fourteenth Tenn. 
Regt. before the "crest" at the stone fence was
Ibid., 1513-1514.
25 Ibid., 594.
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reached. The names of those three men deserve to 
appear in letters of gold in the most conspicuous place 
in the State House at Nashville. They were Thomas 
Davidson, Color Bearer, Columbus Horn, Color Corporal 
(Co G) and - Powell - (Co C) Color Corporal, who fell 
appearently dead just after crossing the Emmetsburg 
Pike, and within one hundred yards of the stone
r r  2 6fence....
Implicit in the quest of Southern white males for
"immortalizing valor" is the concept of self worth stemming
from the opinion of others, particularly one's family,
friends and neighbors back home. Female opinion played a
particularly significant role as examined by Gerald
Linderman in Embattled Courage (New York and London:
Macmillan, Inc., 1987).27
A letter addressed to the soldiers of the Confederacy 
by "The Women of the South" and published in many 
newspapers in 1862 spoke fiercely: "Never turn your
backs on the flag, nor desert the ranks of honor or the 
post of danger. Men guilty of such infamy would sell 
your blood and our honor. (T)he black title of tory 
and deserter will cling to them, disgracing their 
children." ... Another appeal from "The Women of the 
South" appeared during the summer of 1863: "It is 
impossible for us to respect a coward and every true 
woman who has husband, father, brother, or lover ... 
had rather see him prostrate before her with death's
Mockbee, 43-44.
27 Linderman believes that the motivation was similar on 
both sides but it is significant that the examples he uses 
are primarily from the South.
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signet on his noble brow that has never been branded by
cowardice or dishonor, than have him forfeit his good
name and disgrace his manhood by refusing to do his
2 8duty to his country."
Brown also provides an example of the influence of Southern
women on Confederate fighting men.
An old veteran of the Civil War was asked why he and 
his fellow troopers had fought so desperately, so 
bravely, when they knew all along the cause had already 
been hopelessly crushed. "We were afraid to stop," he 
replied, "because the women at home would have been
2 9ashamed of us."
John Russell Dance, 12th Tennessee, was paroled at war’s end
and remembered his feelings of shame at the time.
I did not want to go home, I felt like I never wanted 
my people to see me. We had failed and laid down our
30arms.
The importance of honor is encapsulated in the 
description of the transformation of one Confederate soldier 
who "made as good a soldier as there was in the Regiment. 
Cool and brave in battle and always on hand and never 
shirking duty in camp." The ultimate compliment was to
Linderman, 91.
29 Brown, 172.
30 TQ, 631.
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compare this soldier with "others who occupied honorable
positions in society. 1,31
Honor, as it involved the necessity to retain the good
opinion of others was intertwined with the concept of
manliness. Linderman points out in Embattled Courage that
the word "manhood" was interchangeable with "courage."32
This connection between the opinion of others and the ideal
of manhood was understood clearly by Carlton McCarthy of the
Richmond Howitzers:
In a thousand ways (a man) is tried ... every quality 
is put to the test. If he shows the least cowardice he 
is undone. His courage must never fail. He must be 
manly and independent. 33
The horror and hardship that the men of the Tennessee 
brigade endured was not uncommon to the soldiers of the 
Confederacy. For the Tennesseans, however, campaigning was 
especially hard because they had been cut off from their 
homes early in the war. In the inefficient system of supply
31 Mitchell, 70.
32 Linderman, 8.
33 Carlton McCarthy Detailed Minutiae of Soldier Life in 
the Army of Northern Virginia, 1861-1865 (Richmond: J.W. 
Randolph & English, 1888), 208.
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and support that developed in the de-centralized
Confederacy, the Tennesseans were deprived of any major
support from their home state, and men remembered extended
periods without adequate supplies of shelter, clothing and
food.34 The effect of this hardship was another test of
honor; manliness and the ability to endure without
complaining. Andrew K. Miller, 7th Tennessee, recalled,
I lived the life of. the average infantry soldier. 
Sometimes we had tents and commissary, sometimes we 
slept in the open on our arms, without shelter or 
rations. At times, we suffered intensely from cold and 
hunger. My mother made all of my clothes until I was
promoted to a Lieutenancy, after which I bought my own
uniform.35
William Latta, 27th Tennessee, also remembered those hard 
times.
(Our clothing was light. Sometimes we slept in tents, 
sometimes in the open fields. I have burned a log pile 
to warm the ground so we might have a warm bed to sleep 
on and I have slept on a brush pile to keep out of the
4- 36water.
TQ, 1581.
35 Ibid., 1535.
36 Ibid., 1338.
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A similar account was provided by John Johnson, 7th
Tennessee, who wrote,
After the first year we captured most our clothes. We 
made big log fires to sleep by and to thaw the ground. 
The fire would gradually die out and we would awake to 
find our clothing frozen to the ground.37
Lemuel Beane, 4th Tennessee, recalled,
When I got home I had on the same suit of home made 
jeans clothes that I wore when I started for I had 
never drawn a uniform and had worn the same suit all 
through the war.38
John C. Ingram, 7th Tennessee, remembered that,
at first the clothing was very good but got pretty bad. 
We finally suffered for shoes more than any other 
articles.39
J. Hubbard, 1st Tennessee, recalled a particularly severe
period of the war when he was barefoot and the only food he
had to eat was a half ear of corn roasted in ashes.
My clothes was thin, and I slept where I could. I was 
exposed to all kinds of weather, hunger, measeles and 
cronic diareea. I never was in the hospital.40
Ibid., 1242.
38 Ibid., 305.
39 Ibid., 1201.
40 Ibid., 1172.
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David Grable, 17th Tennessee, describes an incident in which
\
he stood picket in deep snow with neither shoes nor an 
overcoat and only a blanket over his shoulders to ward off 
the wind. He finally obtained a Federal overcoat while out 
sharpshooting.41 The combination of fear, fatigue, want and 
the sorrow and anger of seeing their comrades wounded and 
killed put many men in a murderous mood. R. F. Street, 10th 
Tennessee, remarked that it was his war experience which 
explained, "why men will pick up arms and shoot the life out
42of one another that did not aught against each other."
The men who shared such hardships and fought together 
developed tight bonds of comradeship. Most of them, given 
honorable means to leave the service, chose to remain with 
their regiments. Andrew Miller, 7th Tennessee, was twice 
severely wounded but returned to his unit following his 
recovery. His example was not uncommon. After being cut 
off from his regiment during the retreat to Appomattox, 
Miller and a comrade escaped south to Charlotte, North
Ibid., 936.
Ibid., 2010.
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Carolina where they became part of President Davis' guard 
until the command was surrendered in Washington, Georgia on 
May 9th, 1865.43 John Fite, who had risen to the rank of 
Colonel of the 7th Tennessee, was wounded three times and, 
until he was taken prisoner following Pickett's Charge, 
always returned to his unit.44 But the record is probably 
held by F.S. Harris of the 7th Tennessee who began his 
military career as a private rose to the rank of major and 
was wounded no less than eight times.45 The overwhelming 
majority of the men of the Tennessee Brigade were wounded at 
least once in the course of their military service.
The final attribute of honor, reliance upon oath 
taking, forged perhaps the strongest of all bonds because 
once a man had given his word there was no going back on it.
William Moss, 1st Tennessee, who swore his loyalty to 
defend family and home in 1861, recounts just how important
43 Ibid., 1535.
44
Ibid., 817-818.
45 "Trio of Comrades at Memphis Reunion," CV, July, 
1902, 320.
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this principle was to him and others as late as April 1865
when all hope of independence was gone.
I was captured on picket line with many others who were 
cut off from our commands .... We were sent to Federal 
General Gary's headquarters immediately after 
surrendering. He advises us to take the oath (of 
allegiance to the U.S.) and go home, which many of them 
did. I refused, and he said, "Then go to prison and 
rot, damn you, as you will never be exchanged." ....
I was sent to the Penitentiary alone in charge of two 
guards.46
He was eventually released on June 9th, 1865. Another 
Tennessee Veteran B.D. Rodgers, released from duty in 1865 
on a surgeon's furlough "until called for by the C.S. 
Authorities," responded "I am still waiting."47 These 
soldier were more than simply defiant, they were volunteers 
who had given their pledge to a cause and felt duty and 
honor bound them to continue their service to the very end.
In the months after the war, it was the example of General 
Lee who said that the South needed its men to rebuild the
TQ, 1607-1608. Another example of this is veteran 
Picket in TQ, 1736. Apparently, many soldiers spent extra 
time in prison because they initially refused to take an oath 
of allegiance to the United States of America.
Ibid., 1870.
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nation that the former soldiers finally felt that they could
in good conscience swear allegiance to the U.S.
The men who fought and survived the war took enormous
pride in their paroles, the equivalent of an honorable
discharge, because it was physical evidence of their service
to the cause. For this reason these documents became
treasured keepsakes and heirlooms after the war. The son of
veteran Henry Rodgers proudly relates,
I have copied the exact words of my father's parole 
which is yet kept as a treasure no money could buy. It 
is worn and faded, but framed for safe keeping and will 
be as a precious legacy to our children, grand-children 
and great-grand - children.48
Tennessee veteran Tyree who was to achieve considerable
professional success after the war writes, "I have my parole
framed and I think more of it than I do of my Diploma from
Princeton College."49 Tennessee veteran M.D.L. Taylor who
surrendered with Archer's Brigade at Appomattox wrote; "I
have my parole written by Lieut. L. L. Etter framed and
hanging in my room."50
48 Ibid., 1874.
49 Ibid., 2088.
50 Ibid., 2036
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The pressure exerted by the force of Southern honor was
so strong that white males, despite being revulsed by the
very idea of killing their fellow man, had no choice except
to perform their duty as defined and dictated by honor.51
These dictates of honor actually enabled many to them to
endure the horrors of a war with which they disagreed.
You have frequently heard of the wild excitement of 
battle. I experience no such feelings. There is a 
sense of depression continually working away at my 
heart, caused by a knowledge of the great suffering in 
store for large numbers of my fellow men, that is 
entirely antagonistic to any other emotions. It is 
doubtless true that I feel exhilarated when the enemy 
is driven back and our troops are cheering and 
advancing. Still I cannot be happy as some men are in 
fight. I believe the whole machinery of war is 
indefensible on moral grounds, as a general 
proposition, and nothing but a sense of duty and the 
sacredness of our cause, could at all bouy me.52
Most of the Tennesseans who served in the war were to become
unreconstructed "rebels" like J. W. Ashford, 1st Tennessee
Cavalry, who wrote, "I have never regretted the part that I
"Officials of the Seventh Tennessee Regiment," CV, 
November, 1898, 528.
52 William M. Cash and Lucy Somerville Howorth, eds., My 
Dear Nellie: The Civil War Letters of William L. Nugent to
Eleanor Smith Nugent (Jackson, MS., 1977), 185-186.
/
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took in the war and I got no apologies to make."53 J.W.
Wade, 18th Tennessee, stated directly, if not a bit
cold-bloodedly, "I killed all the Yankees I could."54
Tennessee veteran Joshua Mewborn's summed up in one sentence
what honor meant to the Southern soldier.
I went, I did my duty, and am now proud to be called a 
confederate veteran.55
In the end the war was lost and the Confederacy ceased 
to exist. Ulysses Grant, who accepted the surrender of 
Lee's army, extended terms which avoided humiliating his 
enemy. The message was not lost on Lee. Colonel Charles 
Marshall, who was on Lee's staff during the war and present 
at the surrender at Appomattox, thought that it was Grant's 
offer of "peace without humiliation, peace with honor" that 
allowed the men to recognize that the final battle had been 
fought and that they could now return to the tasks of 
rebuilding their society rather than engaging in a drawn out
TQ, 235.
54 Ibid., 2115.
55 Ibid., 1526.
./
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guerrilla war.56 The war also democratized Southern
society by destroying slavery which was the source of wealth
and power of the old planter elite. The democratization
prepared the ground for decades of new oppression for
emancipated blacks. The code of honor which steeled men to
fight permitted them to accept the inevitability and
finality of their defeat and to adjust to an uncertain
future. They had kept their sacred vow to the very end.
Yet honor, for all its variations - from primal valor 
to Christian graciousness, from bloody deed to "right 
reason" - provided a means to restrict human choices, 
to point a way out of chaos. Thus it helped Southern 
whites to make life somewhat more predictable than it 
would have been otherwise. It established signposts of 
appropriate conduct. It staved off the danger of self- 
love and vainglory and in the circles of the genteel, 
it elevated moderation and learnedness to virtues of 
self-disciplined community service. Since honor gave 
meaning to lives, it existed not as myth but as a vital 
code.57
In the antebellum and Confederate South the concept of 
honor clearly inhibited the choices and dictated the 
behavior of white males. In a perverse way, honor was
Charles Marshall, "Colonel Charles Marshall's Eulogy 
of General Grant," reprinted in Under Both Flags. (Richmond: 
Royal Publishing Co., 1896), 129 and 130.
Brown, 114.
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liberating because it freed men from having to make choices.
White males, regardless of their class, knew what was 
expected of them. When Southern society and its social, 
economic and political institutions collapsed in April, 1865 
what mattered was, as one survivor put it, "I felt all was
58lost except our honor." The earlier adherence to an 
archaic code of honor engendered a new reliance on it in the 
ashes of the war. From those ashes would be constructed 
myths of Southern equality which never existed excepted 
those forged in the crucible of battle. Honor had served 
its purpose in the antebellum South and it was to be used 
again in creating the myth of a "lost cause" and of the 
warriors who had lost everything except their honor.
TQ, 2088.
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